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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
John McEvoy appeals from the district court’s appellate order upholding
his convictions for two county ordinance violations regarding his property.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The state charged McEvoy by citation with violating Canyon County
Ordinances requiring obtaining a building permit and prohibiting public
nuisances. (R., p. 8.) The state moved to amend by replacing the citation with a
complaint. (R., pp. 53-56.) McEvoy moved to dismiss, challenging the notice
provided by the proposed amended complaint. (R., pp. 57-71.)
The court granted the motion to amend (R., p. 83) and the state filed an
amended complaint (R., pp. 84-86). McEvoy filed a renewed motion to dismiss,
challenging the adequacy of notice as to Count II (nuisance). (R., pp. 92-95.)
The trial court denied the motion. (R., p. 97.) McEvoy thereafter entered a
written guilty plea. (R., pp. 98-99.)
Sixteen days after entering the written guilty plea McEvoy moved to
withdraw it. (R., pp. 107-13.) The court denied the motion to withdraw. (R., p.
115.) The magistrate thereafter imposed sentence and entered judgment. (R.,
pp. 116-17.)
McEvoy filed a timely notice of appeal to the district court. (R., pp. 11821.) The district court affirmed McEvoy’s convictions, but reversed the sentence
because the magistrate had erroneously rejected McEvoy’s refusal to be put on
probation. (R., pp. 166-77.) McEvoy timely appealed. (R., pp. 179-81.)
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ISSUES
McEvoy states the issues on appeal as:
A.

Whether the amended complaint was invalid because no
oath was administered on the prosecutor when he filed the
amended complaint

B.

Whether, if the amended complaint is invalid, the charge
must be dismissed because the uniform citation is also
invalid

C.

Whether the district court erred when it concluded that the
magistrate properly denied Mr. McEvoy’s motion to withdraw
his guilty plea

D.

Whether a structural defect existed, because the magistrate
possessed a pre-formed highly negative opinion of the
relevant property

E.

Whether the magistrate abused its discretion in imposing
sentence

(Appellant’s brief, p. 3 (capitalization altered).)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.

Has McEvoy failed to show any jurisdictional defect in the charging
documents?

2.

Has McEvoy failed to show error in the denial of his motion to withdraw his
guilty plea?

3.

Has McEvoy failed to show that the magistrate should have recused
himself?

4.

Is McEvoy’s claim of sentencing error moot because the district court
already granted him relief?

2

ARGUMENT
I.
McEvoy Has Failed To Show Any Jurisdictional Defect In The Charging
Documents
A.

Introduction
The state initiated this case by filing a uniform citation. (R., p. 8.) It later

filed a complaint. (R., pp. 84-86.) On appeal McEvoy argues that the district
court “erred when it concluded that the amended complaint had met the
requirements of I.C.R. 3,” and that the magistrate lacked jurisdiction. (Appellant’s
brief, pp. 3-7.) He further argues that the uniform citation failed to confer subject
matter jurisdiction because it did not comply with Rule 5(g) of the Idaho
Misdemeanor Rules.

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-9.)

McEvoy’s arguments are

frivolous.
B.

Standard Of Review
“Whether a court lacks jurisdiction is a question of law that may be raised

at any time, and over which appellate courts exercise free review.”

State v.

Jones, 140 Idaho 755, 757, 101 P.3d 699, 701 (2004) (citations omitted).
C.

The Magistrate Court Had Subject Matter Jurisdiction
“Subject matter jurisdiction is the power to determine cases over a general

type or class of dispute.” State v. Lute, 150 Idaho 837, 840, 252 P.3d 1255,
1258 (2011) (internal quotes omitted).

Idaho courts have “subject matter

jurisdiction over a crime if any essential element of the crime, including the result,
occurs within Idaho.” State v. Doyle, 121 Idaho 911, 914, 828 P.2d 1316, 1319

3

(1992).

“The information, indictment, or complaint alleging an offense was

committed within the State of Idaho confers subject matter jurisdiction upon the
court.” State v. Rogers, 140 Idaho 223, 228, 91 P.3d 1127, 1132 (2004). An
invalid charging document does not confer subject matter jurisdiction. Lute, 150
Idaho at 840-41, 252 P.3d at 1258-59.
In this case the state filed an amended complaint alleging that McEvoy
violated two county ordinances relating to his property. (R., pp. 84-85.) The
magistrate therefore had jurisdiction. See State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694,
708, 215 P.3d 414, 428 (2009) (“An indictment confers jurisdiction when it alleges
that the defendant committed a criminal offense in the State of Idaho.”); Rogers,
140 Idaho at 228, 91 P.3d at 1132 (a “complaint alleging an offense was
committed within the State of Idaho confers subject matter jurisdiction upon the
court”); State v. Olin, 153 Idaho 891, 893, 292 P.3d 282, 284 (Ct. App. 2012) (a
charging document “confers jurisdiction if it alleges that the defendant committed
a criminal offense within the State of Idaho”). Because the magistrate court had
jurisdiction, the district court did not err by affirming the denial of the motion to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
McEvoy first asserts the magistrate court lacked jurisdiction because the
prosecutor allegedly did not swear to the complaint. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 3-7.)
Specifically, McEvoy asserts only that the complaint was not orally sworn.
(Appellant’s brief, p. 4 (“no oath was ever administered on the prosecutor”).)
McEvoy did not object to the lack of an oral oath, however. (12/30/14 Tr., p. 57,
Ls. 5-14.) Therefore he must show that lack of an oral oath was fundamental
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error. State v. Carter, 155 Idaho 170, 173, 307 P.3d 187, 190 (2013) (“all claims
of unobjected-to error in criminal cases are now subject to the fundamental error
test”). To show fundamental error McEvoy bears the burden of establishing that
the error he alleges “(1) violates one or more of [his] unwaived constitutional
rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional information not
contained in the appellate record . . .), and (3) was not harmless.” State v. Perry,
150 Idaho 209, 228, 245 P.3d 961, 980 (2010).
McEvoy has failed to show that he had any right, constitutional or
otherwise, to an oral oath. On the contrary, Idaho law is clear that a written oath
suffices. See I.M.C.R. 2.2; I.C. § 9-1406.1 A written oath appears right in the
amended complaint. (R., p. 86.) McEvoy has failed to show that lack of an oral
oath deprived the magistrate court of jurisdiction. Also, to the extent McEvoy
contends the written oath was insufficient, he has failed to show fundamental
error.
McEvoy next argues that any failure to follow the procedural rules is a
jurisdictional defect; that the procedural rules require a uniform citation to contain
a date; that the uniform citation in this case does not contain such a date 2; and

McEvoy admits that the authority upon which he relies, State v. McClure, 159
Idaho 758, 367 P.3d 153 (2016), “involved a document that” preceded enactment
of I.C. § 9-1406. (Appellant’s brief, p. 6.) He makes no effort to explain why a
case that dealt with an affidavit initiating contempt proceedings, and not a
criminal complaint, and that pre-dated enactment of I.C. § 9-1406, when the
present case does not, is relevant, much less controlling, in this case.
1

The uniform citation does allege a date, specifically “12/11, 2013.” (R., p. 8.)
McEvoy’s claim is that the date is wrong, because the citation was filed on
January 10, 2013. (Appellant’s brief, p. 9.) McEvoy’s jurisdictional claim is
therefore based on no more than a scrivener’s error.
2
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therefore the court lacked jurisdiction.

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-9.)

This

argument, again unpreserved and therefore reviewable only under a showing of
fundamental error, fails at every step.
The argument that a “uniform citation therefore must conform to the
requirements contained in the Misdemeanor Criminal Rules, in order to confer
subject-matter jurisdiction on the trial court” (Appellant’ brief, p. 8) is specious.
The logical fallacy in the argument that all jurisdictional defects involve violations
of the procedural rules and therefore all violations of the rules are jurisdictional
defects is obvious. The applicable legal standard, stated above, clearly requires
only a citation “alleging an offense was committed within the State of Idaho” in
order to confer “subject matter jurisdiction upon the court.” Rogers, 140 Idaho at
228, 91 P.3d at 1132.

The date the offenses happened “is not a material

element of the crime charged.” State v. Owens, 101 Idaho 632, 637, 619 P.2d
787, 792 (1979); see also State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 41, 46-47, 89 P.3d 881, 88687 (Ct. App. 2003). Thus, the easily curable scrivener’s error in the written date
did not deprive the magistrate court of jurisdiction. Because the citation charged
a crime committed in the state of Idaho regardless of the mistaken date, the trial
court had jurisdiction.
McEvoy makes dubious claims of failure to follow the rules of procedure
and then tries to claim that they amount to jurisdictional error. 3 None of his
jurisdictional claims has merit.

McEvoy waived all non-jurisdictional defects in the pleadings or other error by
entry of his guilty plea. State v. Schmierer, 159 Idaho 768, ___, 367 P.3d 163,
165 (2016).
3
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II.
McEvoy Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Motion To Withdraw His
Guilty Plea
A.

Introduction
After McEvoy pled guilty, the state moved for a viewing of the property in

conjunction with sentencing. (R., pp. 100-01.) The prosecution asserted that
seeing the property live would be more efficient and more helpful to the
sentencing court than viewing the photographic evidence possessed by the state.
(3/13/15 Tr., p. 75, L. 8 – p. 78, L. 9.) McEvoy objected. (R., pp. 102-04.) One
of the bases for the objection was that the viewing was “some sort of
replacement for a warrant” and McEvoy had not waived his Fourth Amendment
rights. (3/13/15 Tr., p. 79, L. 12 – p. 81, L. 2.) The magistrate granted the
motion, noting that the nuisance was ongoing and concluding the best method for
sentencing was to “see exactly what we’re dealing with.” (3/13/15 Tr., p. 81, L. 8
– p. 82, L. 6.4)
After failing on his objection to the viewing of his property, McEvoy moved
to withdraw his plea.

(R., pp. 107-13.)

The basis for the motion was that

“defendant was unaware that he could be forced to allow a law enforcement
officer … and a judicial officer … to roam about his property in order to acquire
additional evidence to use at sentencing or possibly another case.” (R., p. 108;

On appeal, McEvoy claims the viewing order “constituted a Fourth Amendment
violation, because [it] amounted to a warrantless search.” (Appellant’s brief, p.
13.) He does not, however, challenge the order in his issues on appeal.
(Appellant’s brief, p. 3.)
4
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see also 3/31/15 Tr., p. 91, L. 7 – p. 92, L. 7.) The magistrate found that the
ordered inspection was collateral to the plea, and therefore did not render the
plea involuntary.

(3/31/15 Tr., p. 95, L. 19 – p. 96, L. 11.) The magistrate also

found no just reason for withdrawal because the court was not receiving
information it could not have otherwise received by photographic or testimonial
evidence, and both parties had an interest in the sentencing court having a full
understanding of the state of the property. (3/31/15 Tr., p. 96, L. 12 – p. 97, L.
1.) The magistrate ultimately denied the motion. (R., p. 115.)
On appeal McEvoy challenges the district court’s decision affirming the
magistrate. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 9-14.) He has failed, however, to show error.
B.

Standard Of Review
“Appellate review of the denial of a motion to withdraw a plea is limited to

whether the district court exercised sound judicial discretion as distinguished
from arbitrary action.” State v. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho 530, 535-536, 211 P.3d
775, 780-781 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing State v. McFarland, 130 Idaho 358, 362, 941
P.2d 330, 334 (Ct. App. 1997)).
C.

McEvoy Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Motion To
Withdraw His Plea
A motion to withdraw a guilty plea is governed by I.C.R. 33(c), which

provides:
(c) Withdrawal of plea of guilty. A motion to withdraw a plea
of guilty may be made only before sentence is imposed or
imposition of sentence is suspended; but to correct manifest
injustice the court after sentence may set aside the judgment of
conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw defendant’s plea.
8

Although a district court’s discretion should be “liberally exercised” when
ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea made prior to the pronouncement of
sentence, withdrawal of a guilty plea is not an automatic right.

State v.

Hanslovan, 147 Idaho 530, 535, 211 P.3d 775, 780 (Ct. App. 2008). Rather, “the
defendant has the burden of showing a ‘just reason’ exists to withdraw the plea.”
Id. (citations omitted). Where the defendant seeks to withdraw his guilty plea
before sentencing but after he has “learned of the content of the PSI or has
received other information about the probable sentence, the district court may
temper its liberality by weighing the defendant’s apparent motive.”

State v.

Arthur, 145 Idaho 219, 222, 177 P.3d 966, 969 (2008) (citing State v. Mayer, 139
Idaho 643, 647, 84 P.3d 579, 583 (Ct. App. 2004)). Failure to present and
support a just or plausible reason, even absent prejudice to the prosecution, will
weigh against granting withdrawal. Mayer, 139 Idaho at 647, 84 P.3d at 583.
“[T]he good faith, credibility, and weight of the defendant’s assertions in support
of his motion to withdraw his plea are matters for the trial court to decide.”
Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 537, 211 P.3d at 782 (citations omitted).
The magistrate court characterized the nuisance with which McEvoy was
charged and convicted as “operation of a junkyard.” (3/13/15 Tr., p. 81, Ls. 812.) The best way of determining “exactly what we’re dealing with” was to “take
a walk through the property.” (3/13/15 Tr., p. 81, L. 19 – p. 82, L. 3.) McEvoy
has not directly challenged the court’s order for a view of the premises for
sentencing on appeal. (Appellant’s brief, p. 3.) Had he challenged the order,
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and prevailed,5 he would have been entitled to suppression of the evidence
gathered, not withdrawal of his guilty plea. See State v. Green, 158 Idaho 884,
891, 354 P.3d 446, 453 (2015). McEvoy has failed to present any authority that
a subsequent ruling in relation to what evidence will be gathered or considered
for sentencing, even if erroneous, is a valid ground for withdrawing a guilty plea.
See State v. Freitas, 157 Idaho 257, 267, 335 P.3d 597, 607 (Ct. App. 2014) (“A
party waives an issue on appeal if either authority or argument are lacking.”).
McEvoy argues that he did show a just reason for withdrawal of his plea
“because he was not aware that his guilty plea would amount to a waiver of the
right to be free from unreasonable searches.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 10.) This
argument fails because no Fourth Amendment waiver appears on the record.
The magistrate certainly did not claim to be basing its order for a premises view
on any alleged waiver. (3/13/15 Tr., p. 81, L. 8 – p. 82, L. 6.)

Rather, the

magistrate’s ruling is based upon its “broad latitude in making determinations
with regard to the appropriate sentence.”

(3/13/15 Tr., p. 81, Ls. 13-14.)

McEvoy’s argument that his waiver of his Fourth Amendment rights was
unknowing fails because he made no waiver of his Fourth Amendment rights.

The state submits the order for viewing the premises was the equivalent of a
search warrant because it was (1) a judicial order, (2) based on probable cause
to believe that evidence of a crime (the ongoing nuisance), (3) would be found at
particular premises. State v. Wilson, 130 Idaho 213, 215, 938 P.2d 1251, 1253
(Ct. App. 1997) (“Under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
and Art. I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution, a search warrant may be issued only
upon a finding of probable cause to believe that contraband or evidence of a
crime will be found in the place to be searched.”).
5
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If McEvoy believed that the premises viewing order was an unreasonable
search, he should have challenged that order as erroneous on appeal and
sought the applicable remedy of suppressing evidence. Entry of the order, even
if erroneous, was not “good cause” to withdraw his guilty plea.
III.
McEvoy Failed To Show That The Magistrate Should Have Recused Himself
A.

Introduction
During sentencing, the magistrate commented that when looking for a

home two years previously he had driven past McEvoy’s property and was
“dismayed” and that it “looked horrible.” (4/3/15 Tr., p. 152, Ls. 13-20.) After the
court pronounced sentence the defense raised “due process concerns” about the
judge having “a pre-formed view of Mr. McEvoy’s property before [he was] on the
case.” (4/3/15 Tr., p. 157, L. 17 – p. 158, L. 7.) The magistrate judge concluded
there was no due process violation because he was familiar with the area.
(4/3/15 Tr., p. 158, Ls. 8-17.)
The district court affirmed. (R., pp. 168-70.) McEvoy contends the district
court erred because the magistrate “effectively concluded that the crime was
committed before he ever took the case.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 17.) McEvoy has
failed to show error because the record does not support his claim that the
magistrate had concluded in advance that a crime had been committed. On the
contrary, the record shows no actual or implied prejudicial bias.
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B.

Standard Of Review
A judge who is “biased or prejudiced for or against any party or that party’s

case in the action” may be disqualified from hearing the case. I.C.R. 25(b)(4).
However, whether a judge’s involvement in a case reaches a point where
disqualification from further participation becomes necessary is left to the sound
discretion of the trial judge. State v. Kenner, 121 Idaho 594, 826 P.2d 1306
(1992); Sivak v. State, 112 Idaho 197, 731 P.2d 192 (1987).
C.

McEvoy Has Failed To Show Actual Or Implied Bias
Disqualification is appropriate where “there is actual prejudice against the

litigant of such a nature as to render it improbable that the presiding judge could
or would give the litigant a fair and impartial trial.” State v. Elliott, 126 Idaho 323,
329, 882 P.2d 978, 984 (Ct. App. 1994). Under due process, prejudicial bias
may be implied in three circumstances:
(1) instances where the judge has a financial interest in the
outcome of the case; (2) the situation where a judge charges a
defendant with criminal contempt and then proceeds to try him on
the charge; and (3) cases where a person with a personal stake in
a particular case had a significant and disproportionate influence in
placing the judge on the case.
State v. Shackelford, 155 Idaho 454, 459, 314 P.3d 136, 141 (2013).

It is

axiomatic that some knowledge of the facts or circumstances of a case does not
require a finding of bias so long as the person with knowledge may still judge the
case fairly based on what is presented in court.

See, e.g., Nightengale v.

Timmel, 151 Idaho 347, 353, 256 P.3d 755, 761 (2011) (“a trial court does not
abuse its discretion by refusing to excuse for cause jurors whose answers during
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voir dire initially give rise to challenges for cause but who later assure the court
that they will be able to remain fair and impartial”) (quoting Morris v. Thomson,
130 Idaho 138, 141, 937 P.2d 1212, 1215 (1997)); see also State v. Ellington,
151 Idaho 53, 70, 253 P.3d 727, 744 (2011) (“Although not always dispositive,
the trial judge is entitled to rely on assurances from venire persons concerning
partiality or bias.”).
Here the record does not show actual or implied bias. The magistrate
found no actual bias, and McEvoy has failed to show clear error or abuse of
discretion in that finding. Nor do the facts of this case rise to a showing of
implied bias. McEvoy’s claim of a due process violation thus fails.
IV.
McEvoy’s Sentencing Claim Is Moot
“An issue becomes moot if it does not present a real and substantial
controversy that is capable of being concluded by judicial relief.”

State v.

Barclay, 149 Idaho 6, 8, 232 P.3d 327, 329 (2010) (citations omitted).

The

mootness doctrine precludes review when “the issues presented are no longer
live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Idaho
Schools for Equal Educ. Opp. v. Idaho State Bd. of Educ., 128 Idaho 276, 281,
912 P.2d 644, 649 (1996) (quoting Bradshaw v. State, 120 Idaho 429, 432, 816
P.2d 986, 989 (1991)).
The district court determined that the magistrate erred when it imposed
probation when McEvoy declined probation, and therefore it was “appropriate
that the case be returned to the magistrate for resentencing.” (R., pp. 175-77.)
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The district court “vacated” the sentence. (R., p. 177.) Because the district court
vacated McEvoy’s sentence, his sentencing issue on this appeal (Appellant’s
brief, pp. 19-20) is moot.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the appellate decision
of the district court.
DATED this 21st day of June, 2016.

_/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen_
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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